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THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY

Lawrence B. Solum*
THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW.
By Randy E. Barnett. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 347.

$29.95.
INTRODUCTION
Randy Barnett's The Structure of Liberty1 is an ambitious book.
The task that Barnett sets himself is to offer an original and persua
sive argument for a libertarian political theory, a theory that chal
lenges the legitimacy of the central institutions of the modern
regulatory-welfare state. The Structure of Liberty is that rare crea
ture, a book that delivers on most of the promises it makes.
Already the book is on its way to becoming a contemporary classic,
the successor in interest to Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and
Utopia as a source of ideas and arguments for the revitalization of
an important intellectual tradition that has long stood at the periph
ery of legal and political theory. No one \vill be surprised that
Barnett's argument rests on a controversial and contested vision of
human interaction. What may come as a shock is the power of this
vision to provoke a thoughtful response from readers with ideologi
cal and political commitments that are poles apart from those ar
ticulated in The Structure of Liberty.
One of the great virtues of The Structure of Liberty2 is that it is
written with an unusual clarity of expression. Structure avoids a
central vice of much contemporary political philosophy: the book is
filled with concrete examples and specific public policy proposals.
At the same time, Structure embraces the central virtue of modern
political theory; the argument is carefully articulated so as to lay
bare the bones of the ideas and expose them to careful scrutiny.
Barnett has written a readable book that nonetheless will repay
careful study.
Despite Structure's many strengths, the book is not without its
flaws. Chief of these is the book's avoidance of fundamental ques
tions about the nature of political justification. Barnett attempts to
* Professor of Law and Willi am M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola
Marymount University. B.A. 1981, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D. 1984,
Harvard. - Ed.
1. Randy Barnett is the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Law at Boston University School
of Law.
2. Hereinafter STRUCTURE.
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craft an argument that eschews reliance on any particular frame
work for political and moral theory. The result, however, is a work
that neither embraces deep foundations nor provides a compelling
explanation for their absence. For this reason, the full implications
of Structure are cloudy, and a final assessment of its merits requires
an excavation of its foundations - an effort that is begun but
hardly completed in this review.
What is certain is that Structure provides a rich and provocative
set of arguments that will stimulate strong reactions from both the
friends and foes of its intriguing mix of classical liberalism, libertari
anism, and anarchism. Structure is filled with radical proposals,
ranging from the abolition of criminal punishment to the suggestion
that private adjudication and law enforcement services could
replace the state entirely. Barnett defends these suggestions with
common-sense ideas that are assembled into a powerful theoretical
framework. Even if Structure does not convert the heathen, it will
surely change the topic of many conversations about the proper
function of law.

!.

THE STRUCTURE OF STRUCTURE

The central argument of Structure aims to justify a set of ideas
about fair social organization. Barnett calls these ideas "the liberal
conception of justice" (p. 63). The argument for the liberal concep
tion focuses on three central problems of human interaction: the
problem of knowledge, the problem of interest, and the problem of
power. Barnett argues that given "the goal of enabling persons to
survive and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living in
society with others" (p. 23), these fundamental problems of human
interaction create constraints on the possible forms of social organi
zation. Unless society is organized to respect rights of several prop
erty, freedom of contract, restitution, and self-defense, the
problems of knowledge, interest, and power will make it impossible
for all persons (or each and every person) to survive and pursue
happiness, peace, and prosperity. Barnett's liberal conception of
justice is simply a detailed formulation of the content of the rights
that must be respected.3 Near the conclusion of Structure, Barnett
imagines a society that respects these rights to the hilt, a polycentric

3. The liberal conception of justice is given eight formulations at various points in The
Structure of Liberty, each formulation adding content to the conception as the problems of
knowledge, interest, and power are developed. The last formulation gives the fullest sense of
Barnett's views and it is quoted here in full:
Formulation 8. Justice is respect for the rights or individuals and associations.
(1) The right ofseveralproperty specifies a right to acquire, possess, use, and dispose of
scarce physical resources - including their own bodies. Resources may be used in
any way that does not physically interfere with other persons' use and enjoyment of
their resources. While most property rights are freely alienable, the right to one's
person is inalienable.
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constitutional order in which the state has withered and been
replaced by private associations which provide what economists
have traditionally called "public goods," such as police protection
and dispute resolution.

A.

Foundations

If the central argument of Structure is the justification of the
liberal conception of justice based on the problems of knowledge,
interest, and power, the first chapter is Barnett's attempt to build
the philosophical foundation upon which this justification rests.
This chapter is perhaps the least satisfying in the book, and the
issues that it raises will be examined later in this review. The cen
tral organizing idea is the notion of a natural right. Borrowing ter
minology from Philippa Foot,4 Barnett argues that natural rights
(2) The right offirst possession specifies that property rights to unowned resources are
acquired by being the first to establish control over them and to stake their claim[.]
(3) The right offreedom of contract specifies that a rightholder's consent is both neces
sary (freedomfrom contract) and sufficient (freedom to contract) to transfer alien
able property rights - both during one's life and, by using a "will," upon one's
death. A manifestation of assent is ordinarily necessary unless one party somehow
has access to the other's subjective intent.
(4) Violating these rights by force or fraud is unjust.
(5) The right of restitution requires that one who violates the rights that define justice
must compensate the victim of the rights violation for the harm caused by the injus
tice, and such compensation may be collected by force, if necessary. The principle
ofstrictproportionality limits the amount of restitution to that which is necessary to
fully compensate, but not overcompensate, the victim.
(6) The right of self-defense permits the use of force against those who threaten to
violate the rights of another. Normal self-defense is permissible when the commis
sion of a rights violation is imminent. Extended self-defense is permissible when a
person has communicated, by prior rights violations or some other prior conduct
proven to a high degree of certainty, a threat to violate rights in the future. Self·
defense should be proportionate to the risk posed by the threat.
P. 214.
4. One difficulty that philosophically-trained readers may have with Structure is Barnett's
tendency to adapt terminology and theories to his own purposes, even when the ideas that he
borrows had quite different meanings and functions in their original context. Thus, Philippa
Foot's use of the phrase "hypothetical imperative" is located in her work in metaethics, but
Barnett does not discuss metaethical issues when he invokes her work. Compare Philippa
Foot, Morality as a System ofHypothetical Imperatives, 81 PHIL. REv. 305 (1972), with pp. 1718.
A similar difficulty exists with respect to Barnett's use of H.L.A. Hart's notion of the
minimum content of the natural law. Hart introduces this notion to show that the constraints
on the nature of law imposed by the human condition are very weak indeed, whereas Barnett
invokes Hart's notion in support of what, at first blush, might seem to be the opposite conclu
sion, i.e., that fundamental problems of human nature impose very strong constraints on the
content of the law. This seeming opposition is dissolved once we appreciate that Hart intro
duced his idea to show that nature imposes very weak constraints on the concept of law, that
is, on what can count as a "law," from the point of view of philosophical analysis. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CoNCEPI' OF LAW 188-89 (1961). Barnett uses Hart's terminology for the very
different purpose of showing that nature imposes very strong constraints on what laws can be
justified. P. 11. Barnett would not claim that his argument establishes that compliance with
his liberal conception of justice is required for a norm to count as a law.
It would be unfortunate if criticism of Structure were to focus on Barnett's lamentable
tendency to credit others with ideas that are actually his own. Although Barnett's adaptation

Structure of Liberty

May 1999]

1783

are justified by a "hypothetical imperative" (p. 17). As laid out by
Barnett, the hypothetical imperative includes both a normative and
a factual predicate. The normative predicate is the goal of provid
ing each individual with the opportunity to pursue happiness,
peace, and prosperity. The factual predicate is provided by
Barnett's development of the problems of knowledge, interest, and
power. The conclusion or imperative is the set of rights that
Barnett specifies in his liberal conception of justice, e.g., several
property, freedom of contract, restitution, and self-defense.
Asking the following question can draw out an important ambi
guity in Structure's foundation: to whom is the hypothetical imper
ative addressed? One possible answer is that Structure is addressed
to the interest of each and every actual individual in peace, prosper
ity, and happiness. If this is the case, then the argument of Structure
must meet an extraordinarily high burden. Surely there are some
individuals who are advantaged by legal regimes that restrict prop
erty and contract rights: o�e example might be highly placed mem
bers of the nomenclatura in the former Soviet Union. Another
possibility is that the argument of Structure is addressed to hypo
thetical individuals behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance5 as to their
present circumstances. If Barnett intends his argument to rest on
this sort of contractarian premise, then Structure fails to acknowl
edge the many criticisms that have been leveled at this form of
political justification. Yet another possibility is that the hypotheti
cal imperative is addressed to society as a whole. For example, it
might be the case that the argument of Structure is based on a utili
tarian principle of the greatest "happiness, peace, and prosperity"
for the greatest number. If Structure rests on this sort of conse
quentialism, then Barnett owes us an explanation for Structure's
failure to deal with the many objections to consequentialism raised
by moral and political philosophers. These foundational questions
are important, and they will be taken up again, after this brief over
view of the structure of Structure has been completed.
B.

The Method of Structure

After the first chapter, most of Structure is devoted to the devel
opment of the thesis that the liberal conception of justice is the best
solution to the problems of knowledge (chapters 2-6), interest
(chapters 7-9), and power (chapters 10-14). A preliminary word
about the method of Structure may help to clarify the nature of
Barnett's claims and his arguments for them. The central claims of
Structure are empirical. Barnett argues for the existence of the
of the terminology and ideas of others to suit his own purposes introduces some confusion in
his exposition, this is, at bottom, a problem of style and not of substance.
5. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE 136-42 {1971).
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problems of knowledge, interest, and power on the basis of evi
dence about the nature of human beings and their social interac
tion. How does Barnett support these empirical claims? For the
most part, the answer to this question is not through the use of
social science research or history. Rather, Barnett's method is pri
marily to appeal to common-sense premises that are likely to be
widely shared. Some readers may object to this method on the
ground that it is insufficiently rigorous. There is certainly some
thing to this objection. Before we make radical changes in social
organization on the basis of Barnett's arguments, we would surely
want to subject his empirical premises to the most rigorous testing,
employing all of the resources of social science to the extent that
they would provide useful confirmation or refutation of Barnett's
views. Nonetheless, Barnett's method stands in an important tradi
tion of social thought. Some of his armchair observations about
human nature rely on the same sort of insights as did similar obser
vations made by Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith. Some of the
empirical premises of Structure might be viewed as plausible
hypotheses as opposed to proven conclusions. Some of Barnett's
premises are, in fact, unassailable on empirical grounds. For exam
ple, it is obviously true that each of us has empirical knowledge
about our own circumstances that is not shared by total strangers
(p. 31); social science will have little to add concerning the truth of
such premises.
C.

Knowledge, Interest, and Power

Much of the merit of Structure lies in its detailed development
of Barnett's central thesis - that the problems of knowledge, inter
est, and power require the liberal conception of justice, given the
goal of providing each individual with the opportunity to pursue
happiness, security, and stability. Not only does the development
of the problems of knowledge, interest, and power account for the
lion's share of Structure's text; this exposition is the heart of
Barnett's argument. The success or failure of Structure lies in
Barnett's ability to persuade readers that these are serious
problems and that no form of social organization can succeed unless
they are overcome.

1. Three Problems of Knowledge
The first cluster of problems of social interaction, Barnett calls
"[t]he [p]roblems of [k]nowledge" (p. 27). There are actually three
distinct problems of knowledge. The first of these (called "the first
order problem of knowledge") focuses on the relationship between
individualized knowledge and effective resource use. The identifi
cation of this problem is not original with Barnett, who acknowl-
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edges the work of the economist Friedrich Hayek.6 Each individual
has personal knowledge (of her own perceptions, preferences,
needs, desires, abilities, and opportunities) that is; for the most part,
inaccessible to other members of society (pp. 30-31). In addition,
each individual has local knowledge that is shared only by limited
groups or associations (p. 34). In order for individuals to be able to
use resources, they must act on the basis of their personal and local
knowledge, yet take into account their ignorance of the personal
and local knowledge that is in the possession of others (p. 36). This
problem is relevant to one of the basic questions about desirable
forms of social organization: should society be ordered on the basis
of centralized authority or decentralized individual decisionmaking
(pp. 45-50)? Barnett argues that jurisdiction over resources should
be vested so as to permit the use of personal and local knowledge
relevant to use of the particular resources. Individuals should be
given rights of exclusive control over the resources they will use (p.
52). Permitting consensual transfer of jurisdiction over resources
allows individuals to use their personal and local knowledge.
Requiring that such transfers be consensual provides a mechanism
by which each individual can take into account the personal and
local knowledge of others that is relevant to the use of the resource;
that mechanism is the market price (pp. 52-54). These arguments
are the foundations for Barnett's first formulation of the liberal
conception of justice, which includes the right of several property,
the right of first possession, and the right of freedom of contract (p.
83).
The second-order problem of knowledge deals with the difficul
ties created by the need to make rights publicly available - that is,
to make knowledge of the actions required by justice available to
everyone (p. 85). Barnett recognizes that this problem of knowl
edge is closely connected with the ideal of the rule of law, and, in
particular, with the notion that the rule of law requires that the law
be public (p. 89). Barnett draws a distinctive conclusion from this
requirement, one that is key to his claim that solving the problems
of knowledge, interest, and power requires a minimal role for the
state. The key idea is that in order for individuals to know what the
law is, the set of legal rights must satisfy the requirement of com
possibility. Compossibility requires that exercise of any right by a
citizen be guaranteed not to interfere with the exercise of any right
by any other citizen. This entails the conclusion that rights cannot
contradict or be in tension with one another (pp. 90 92). Putting it
another way, each individual must have a sphere of liberty that does
not invade the sphere of any other individual. This move is impor-

6. Pp. 29-30. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, in !NDIVIDUAL
ECONOMIC ORDER 77 (1948).

AND
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tant, because it justifies the limitation of the liberal conception of
justice to negative rights, such as rights of property and contract.
The corollary of this limitation is that positive rights, such as a right
to welfare, are excluded. Positive rights can collide with negative
rights and hence can violate the requirement of compossibility.
The second-order problem of knowledge constrains the substan
tive content of the law in another way. It is possible to distinguish
between legal rules on the basis of their ability to provide certain
guidance in concrete cases. Barnett demonstrates this point with
one of many illustrative stories involving a fictional pair, Ann and
Ben. Imagine, for example, that the law provides the following rule
for the acquisition of land: "The one who needs the land the most
gets it." Does this rule communicate a determinate standard for
conduct that could guide the actions of Ben and Ann?

Assume that both Ann and Ben are well aware of this precept in
advance of any dispute between them. Ben comes across the clearing.
Can he know that he needs it more than Ann? When Ann returns,
how can she know whether to vacate or remain? The substance of
this precept gives rise to a second-order problem of knowledge con
cerning what justice requires. [p. 100]
rule that grants the first possessor jurisdiction over the land
might be underdeterminate in particular cases but it would not be
inherently uncertain in the same way that the greater-need-for-the
land rule must be (p. 100).

A

The third-order problem of knowledge concerns the need to
specify concrete and particular conventions of justice that can guide
action (p. 108). This problem arises in part because a theory of jus
tice underdetermines the content of action-guiding rules. For
example, the abstract formulations of the rights to private property
and freedom of contract that Barnett specifies in his liberal concep
tion of justice are insufficiently concrete to decide particular dis
putes. In order to overcome this part of the problem, some process
for specifying the content of the rules must be instituted. This pro
cess of specification requires knowledge of the complexities of
human interaction (pp. 113-14). Barnett claims that an evolution
ary process of common-law adjudication is the preferred solution to
the third-order problem of knowledge (pp. 114-30).

2.

The Problems of Interest

Independent of problems of knowledge are problems of inter
est. Barnett identifies three of these. The first is the problem of
partiality. If each individual is to pursue happiness, then social
interaction must be structured so as to allow individuals to pursue
their own interests. Yet partiality to one's own interests may inter
fere with the pursuit by others of their interests (pp. 135-38).
Barnett claims that decentralized jurisdiction over resources in the
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form of property rights and freedom of contract solves the problem
of partiality. A regime of property and contract allows individuals
to pursue their own projects and interests. Moreover, property
rights and the requirement that transfer be consensual insure that
each must take the interests of the other into account before using
resources over which the other has jurisdiction (pp. 139-41).
Barnett illustrates these abstract points with another fable of Ann
and Ben:
If Ben wants to build a home on a comer of the land that Ann has
cultivated for crops, then he must offer Ann something she would
prefer to that which he is asking her to give up. In this way, Ann's
partial interests are incorporated into Ben's cost of choice. When
pursuing his personal projects, Ann's rights of several property and
freedom from contract require Ben to act "impartially" with respect
to Ann's interest whether he wants to or not. [p. 140]

The problem of partiality illustrates one of the central features of
the argumentative structure of Structure. Barnett claims that the
problems of knowledge, interest, and power provide independent
justifications for the liberal conception of justice. Even if there
were no problem of knowledge, and Ben had independent knowl
edge of Ann's interests in her land, Ben's partiality to his own inter
ests creates the risk that he would act without taking Ann's
interests into account. And even if Ben were perfectly impartial, he
could not take Ann's interests into account given that there is a
problem of knowledge.
The second problem of interest is the incentive problem.
Barnett's discussion of this problem begins with the "subjective
'cost of choice,' "7 i.e., the costs borne by anyone who makes a
choice involving the use of resources. ·Because of a problem of
knowledge, only the individual who makes the choice is fully aware
of the nature and extent of such costs (pp. 150-53). Because of such
costs, individuals normally require incentives to discover and use
information about the effective use of resources. Barnett argues
that a right of first possession, a right of private property, and free
dom of contract provide a guarantee that individuals who incur
such costs will not have the benefits taken away from them by
others. Thus, the liberal conception of justice provides incentives
for the efficient use of resources (p. 155). In addition, the incentive
problem justifies the addition of another right to the liberal concep
tion, a right of restitution: "[O]ne who violates the rights that de
fine justice must compensate the victim of the rights violation for
the harm caused by the injustice" (p. 159).
7. P. 150. Barnett borrows this notion from James Buchanan. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
AN INQUIRY IN EcoNOMIC THEORY 42-43 (1969).

CoST AND CHorCE:
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Barnett's discussion of the incentive problem is also the occa
sion for a provocative discussion of public goods and free rider
problems. The conventional economic wisdom about public goods
is that nonexcludable goods like clean air or national defense can
not be provided by markets because of free-rider problems. Who
would sign up for a voluntary national defense subscription?
Barnett's challenge to this conventional wisdom consists of a
number of burden-shifting strategies. Primary among these is a
move that is repeated frequently in Structure: Barnett challenges
the advocates of state-provided public goods to show that the state
can actually deliver the goods, given the problems of knowledge,
interest, and power (p. 162). Another burden-shifting move is to
suggest that the assumption that markets cannot provide particular
goods may result from a failure of imagination. Here Barnett in
vokes the famous example of lighthouses, often assumed to be pub
lic goods by armchair economists (pp. 163-64), but shown by
Ronald Coase to be frequently supported by fees charged by
nearby ports.8 These burden-shifting strategies are surely thought
provoking, but they hardly carry the day for the radical hypothesis
(perhaps implicit in Structure, but never explicitly advanced by
Barnett) that there are no public goods, the provision of which by a
state would actually advance the common interest in happiness,
peace, and prosperity.
The third problem of interest is the compliance problem. The
liberal conception of justice requires those who violate the rights of
others to provide restitution for the harm done. But in the absence
of an enforcement mechanism, rights violators will lack an incentive
to provide such restitution. Barnett argues that this problem justi
fies a right to collect such compensation by force (pp. 174-81) and a
right of self-defense (pp. 185-91). This section of the book provides
an apt example of Barnett's ability to combine the discussion of
concrete policy with abstract political theory. In a world where
many rights violators are sure to be impecunious, the question
arises as to how compensation is to be collected. Barnett's solution
is to restructure the public system of prisons into privately owned
engines of entrepreneurship, with prisoners engaging in market
transactions both within and without the penal system (pp. 176-81).
Particularly intriguing is his discussion of Maine's inmate craft pro
gram, with some inmates supposedly earning as much as $100,000
per year (p. 180).

8. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. LAW & EcoN. 357, 360-62 (1974).
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The Problems of Power

The third and final set of problems of social interaction consists
of problems of power. Although Barnett claims that the problems
of knowledge and interest are independent of one another, the
problem of power is derivative of the problem of interest in the
following sense: because the compliance problem justifies the use
of force, the problem of power arises in connection with such uses
of force. Absent problems of interest, the problem of power would
not necessarily arise. There are two distinct problems of power, the
problem of enforcement (and nonenforcement) error and the prob
lem of enforcement abuse.
The problem of enforcement error arises because no system of
enforcement will be error-free. Some individuals who have not vio
lated rights will be forced to pay compensation, and some individu
als whose rights have been violated will not receive compensation.
A similar problem arises with respect to erroneous use of self
defense. Thus, the question arises as to how to minimize the sever
ity and frequency of enforcement error (pp. 198-99). Barnett's pro
posal for reducing the severity of enforcement error is both simple
and controversial. Barnett argues for a principle of strict propor
tionality, "that the amount of the sanction be limited to what is nec
essary to fully compensate without overcompensating the victim"
(p. 204).
Barnett then argues against the deterrence theory of punish
ment on a number of grounds. One of these is notable because it
represents a departure from the general argumentative strategy of
Structure. Barnett argues that imposing severe sanctions in order to
increase the deterrent effect of punishment is open to moral criti
cism on the grounds that such punishments will inevitably also be
visited on innocent persons because of the problem of enforcement
error (p. 228). The moral intuition to which Barnett appeals is
surely plausible, but it would seem to rely on some prior notion of a
moral right that is independent of the concern for happiness, peace,
and prosperity. Barnett also argues that increasing the severity of
punishment may not translate into actual deterrence for a variety of
reasons. Among these are that criminals may simply become more
effective at evading punishment, or they may have such a high dis
count rate for future costs that severity will have little effect on
their choices (p. 230).
The problem of enforcement abuse is actually a more specific
form of the problem of partiality. Given that those with the power
to impose punishments will be partial to their own interests, the
power to punish or to use force to compel restitution is likely to be
abused. Barnett argues that the problem of enforcement abuse is
not resolved by what he calls the single power principle, the notion
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that there must exist a single institution with a monopoly on the
coercive use of force for each geographical territory (pp. 240-50). If
power is structured in a simple hierarchy, there is no guarantee that
those at the top will not themselves abuse power (p. 244). Nor do
institutional constraints provide a guarantee against such abuses.
For example, Barnett argues that divided government with a
scheme of checks and balances is not a sufficient safeguard: "Even
tually, entrepreneurs of power - master politicians, judges, execu
tives, or outsiders called 'special interest groups' - figure out ways
to teach those who share the monopoly that each has an interest in
cooperating with the others in using force against those who are
outside the monopoly" (p. 254). Similar arguments are advanced
against the contentions that democratic elections (pp. 251-52) or a
right of exit (pp. 254-55) can guard against enforcement abuse.

D. A Polycentric Constitutional Order
With the discussion of the problem of enforcement abuse,
Structure negotiates a crucial tum. The argument up to this point
justifies a strong set of rights, but does not address the question of
institutional structure. Barnett's discussion of the problem of
enforcement abuse sets up the most radical and controversial chap
ters of Structure entitled "Constitutional Constraints on Power" and
"Imagining a Polycentric Constitutional Order: A Short Fable." In
these chapters, Barnett moves beyond the strong classical liberalism
or modest libertarianism that characterize the bulk of Structure and
offers suggestions that are radically libertarian and even anarchist
in nature.
The key idea here is that of a polycentric constitutional order a regime in which "multiple legal systems exercise the judicial func
tion and multiple law-enforcement agencies exercise the executive
function" (p. 258). No state acts to coordinate these private entities
or resolve disputes between them. All power is private power, reg
ulated by contractual agreements between individuals and judicial
or law-enforcement enterprises. Even readers who are still on the
boat when Structure reaches these uncharted waters may wish to
disembark at this point. One difficulty that is likely to occur to
many readers is parallel to Hobbes's argument in Leviathan for his
version of the single power principle. Wouldn't jurisdictional con
flicts between the various executive and judicial agencies degener
ate into the war of all against all in which there are "no Arts; no
Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish and short"?9 Barnett recognizes this problem and appeals
9.

THOMAS

HoBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991).
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to a variety of real-world examples of voluntary cooperation
between competing legal systems for dealing with jurisdictional
conflicts, including rules governing choice of law and personal juris
diction (p. 277). But merely pointing to such phenomena is not suf
ficient to make out Barnett's argument, because these mechanisms
work in the context of a legal order that subscribes to the single
power principle.
Barnett does advance an argument against the likelihood that
Hobbesian problems would emerge from a polycentric constitu
tional order. The crucial passage is worth quoting at length:
Extended conflicts between different court systems in a polycentric
constitutional order are also quite unlikely. It is simply not in the
interest of repeat players (and most of their clients) to attempt to
obtain short-run gains at the cost of long-run conflict . . .. [W]here
they have the opportunity to cooperate, participants in even the most
intense conflicts - warfare, for example - tend to evolve a "live and
let live" philosophy. [p. 276]

These remarks are suggestive, but hardly dispositive of the
Hobbesian objection. The eminent Hobbes scholar Sharon Lloyd
summarizes one interpretation of Hobbes's argument as follows:
The state of nature is a state of war because scarcity of resources rela
tive to demand leads to competition; competition, to fear of invasion
(compounded by fear of invasion, not by the needy but by prideful
people in pursuit of glory); fear of invasion, to preemptive aggression;
and fear of preemptive aggression, to further preemptive aggression.
Given this state of affairs, it is rational for people to make preemptive
attacks on their fellows.10

Of course, neither Barnett's optimism nor Hobbes's pessimism may
accurately predict the fate of a polycentric constitutional order.
Surely, however, more is required than Barnett has offered for soci
ety to feel confident enough to make the leap to the utopian world
where the state has been replaced by private courts and law
enforcement agencies.

E. Responses to Objections
The final chapter of Structure offers replies to a number of ob
jections. These replies are brief and suggestive in nature, and they
are not likely to satisfy Barnett's critics. The sort of strategy pur
sued in the replies is illustrated by Barnett's consideration of two
questions that are likely to be raised about Structure. Why are the
problems of knowledge, interest, and power the only problems ad
dressed by the liberal conception of justice? Why not the problem
of inequality, or the problem of need, or some other problem?
Barnett's strategy here is not to take these problems head on, but
10. S.A. LLOYD, IDEALS AS INTERESTS IN HOBBES'S LEVIATHAN 9-10 {1992).

1792

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1780

instead to use the central argunient of Structure to shift the burden
of going forward back to those who raise the questions:
One ought not to infringe upon the rights and procedures that make a
well-ordered social life possible to address other pressing problems if
doing so will seriously undermine our ability to address the problems
of knowledge, interest, and power. Addressing these problems is a
prerequisite to any hope we have of effectively handling the other
problems of social life. A society that failed to deal effectively with
the problems of knowledge, interest, and power would be in chaos.
And a society in chaos cannot deal effectively with any social prob
lem, however serious it may be. [p. 326]
,

Stated in this fashi.on, Barnett's move may leave his critics substan
tial room for maneuver. Grant to Barnett the premise that the
problems of knowledge, interest, and power must be addressed to
some degree to avoid social chaos. Further grant that social chaos
would preclude the resolution of other social problems such as need
or inequality. It may not be difficult for Barnett's critics to show
that a society that does not fully respect the rights contained in the
liberal conception of justice can nonetheless solve the problems of
knowledge, interest, and power to a degree sufficient to avoid
chaos. Presumably, modem social welfare states address problems
of inequality through taxation. and redistribution schemes without
falling into complete social disorder.
Barnett makes another burden-shifting reply to critics who may
raise problems other than those of knowledge, interest, and power.
He suggests that the burden is on those who advocate state action
to solve such problems to show that the particular problem they
pose cannot be solved within the constraints of the liberal concep
tion of justice. For example, the problem of need might be solved
by charity; Barnett suggests that history supports this conclusion,
although he provides rather scanty backing for this claim (p. 326).
Conducted at this level, the debate between Barnett and his oppo
nents is not likely to be settled. Resolution of this sort of empirical
disagreement is sure to be difficult. Barnett and many of his critics
advocate utopian social structures that, because they do not actually
exist, do not yield empirical evidence to resolve disputes about their
relative efficacy in addressing either the problem of need or
Barnett's problems of knowledge, interest, and power.
The final chapter of Structure also takes up an objection that is
related to the problems of need and inequality, the objection that
Barnett's liberal conception of justice is inadequate because it fails
to take into account the problem of distributive justice. This objec
tion and Barnett's reply to it can serve as a vehicle for situating the
project of Structure in the context of contemporary political
philosophy.
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Barnett begins his analysis of this objection by posing a series of
questions about the alternative theories that advocate forced tak
ings to achieve distributive justice (p. 309). Some of these questions
raise the issues debated among theorists of distributive justice
under the rubric of the "equality of what" debate. Does distribu
tive justice require equality of welfare, equality of opportunity for
welfare, equality of resources, satisfaction of Rawls's difference
principle,U or something else? As Barnett acknowledges, however,
the lack of consensus about what distributive justice requires does
not excuse him from answering particular theories of distributive
justice on their merits (p. 310). Moreover, at least some accounts of
distributive justice are sufficiently developed (those of Dworkin12
and Rawls, for example) so that Barnett could address them on
their merits if he chose to do so. Barnett adopts a different strat
egy, pleading that because there are so many different theories of
distributive justice, it is appropriate for him to "focus [on] some of
the challenges posed for any theory of distributive justice by the
problems of knowledge, interest, and power" (pp. 310-11).
Barnett's most persuasive answer to the distributive-justice
objection is a variation of the burden-shifting strategy employed
elsewhere in Structure. Barnett challenges these theorists to show
how their theories can solve the problems of knowledge, interest,
and power. For example, Barnett makes the following argument
about the problem of knowledge:

Let's assume we settle on a particular conception of distributive jus
tice. We are now faced with the task of determining who will have
their resources taken away and who will be the beneficiary of the tak
ing. Whatever the conception of distributive justice one adopts, the
circumstances of every person in the community, or state, or nation,
or world will have to be examined to see if they meet the posited
standard. Does each person have "enough" of the primary goods?
Which person has a surplus that may be taken from her to give to
another[?] [p. 311]
But is this really a problem posed for any theory of distributive
justice? Because Barnett mentions "primary goods," a feature
unique to Rawls's theory,13 we can assume t}lat Barnett believes
that this objection does at least apply to that theory.
A close examination of Rawls's theory reveals that Barnett's
questions are premised on fundamental misunderstandings of the
11. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 76-78.
12. See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PuB.
A.FF. 185 {1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. A.FF. 283, 315 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What ls Equality? Part 3: The Place of Lib
erty, 73 lowA L. REv. 1 {1987); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equal
ity, 22 u.s.F: L. REv. 1, 4 {1987).
13. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 62.
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nature of the theory. A brief explication is required to show why
this is so. One relevant feature of Rawls's theory is the difference
principle, which is stated in final form as follows:

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with
the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity.14
This principle does not actually apply to all of the "primary goods"
as Barnett's question implies. Among the primary goods are the
basic liberties,15 including the right to ownership of private prop
erty.16 A preliminary point is that Rawls and Barnett are actually
in agreement on the principle of distribution that applies to the ba
sic liberties (although they disagree about the list of liberties to be
incorporated in a conception of justice). Rawls's first principle of
justice is that "[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all."17 Similarly, Barnett holds that the
rights incorporated in his liberal conception of justice should be
equal in their distribution. When it comes to the basic liberties,
Barnett's questions - "Does each person have 'enough' of the pri
mary goods?" "Which person has a surplus that may be taken from
her to give to another?" (p. 311) - are simply misplaced.
With this technical point about the primary goods out of the
way, the substance of Barnett's objection can be considered. In ad
dition to the basic liberties, the primary goods also include income
and wealth.18 Presumably, Barnett's questions are directed at the
distribution of these primary goods. Once again, however, the
que�tions are based on a misunderstanding of Rawls's theory. The
two principles of justice do not apply to individuals directly; instead,
they apply to the basic structure.19 The question for Rawls is
whether the institutions that comprise the basic structure of society
satisfy the difference principle. The question is not whether the
least advantaged individual in society is benefited by any given ine
quality in wealth and income. Indeed, Rawls recognizes the very
problems of knowledge that Barnett raises and relies on them as
part of the justification for limiting the application of the two prin
ciples of justice to the basic structure of society:
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 302.
See id. at 62.
See id. at 61.
Id. at 302.
See id. at 61.
See id. at 7.
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[T]here are no feasible -and -practicable rules that ·it is sensible to im
pose on individuals that can prevent the erosion of background jus
tice. This is because the rules governing agreements and individual
transactions cannot be too complex, or require too much information
to be correctly applied . . . . Thus any sensible scheme of rules will not
exceed the capacity of individuals to grasp and follow them with suffi
cient ease, nor will it burden citizens with requirements of knowledge
and foresight that they cannot normally meet.20
The point is that Rawls has structured his theory in order to take
the problem of knowledge into account. To advance the debate be
yond this point, Barnett will need to move beyond the formulation
of generic objections to theories of qistributive justice in the ab
stract and engage with particular theories, including their responses
to the problems of knowledge.
Despite this weakness in Barnett's treatment of the topic of dis
tributive justice, there is considerable merit in his approach.
Indeed, Barnett's elaboration of the problem of knowledge sheds
light on Rawls's discussion of that problem. Moreover, my discus
sion of Barnett's replies to the distributive justice objection has
been highly selective. He raises a number of other questions and
objections that may fare better when they are considered in juxta
position with particular theories of distributive justice. To clarify, I
should add that I am n9t offering a critique of Barnett's theory
from the perspective of Rawls's theory of distributive justice.
Rather, the point of this discussion is to show that Barnett's attempt
to shift the burden back to distributive justice critics cannot succeed
without Barnett's engaging particular theories in depth.
With this brief examination of the final chapter of Structure, my
summary of the structure of Barnett's book is complete. I now re
turn to the topic that begins the book, the theoretical framework
that forms the foundation of Structure.

II.

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STRUCTURE
A.

OF LIBERTY

The Foundational Strategy

Barnett claims that the argument of Structure is properly located
in the natural rights tradition (p. 17-25). His interpretation of that
tradition is based on the notion that natural rights are hypothetical
imperatives. Given the problems of knowledge, interest, and
power, if the goal is to enable persons to survive and pursue happi
ness, peace, and prosperity with others, then the rights specified by
the liberal conception of justice should be respected. Barnett's ar
gument is that given certain ends, the means are natural in the same
sense that the principles used by engineers to build a bridge are
20. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 267-68 (1993).
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natural. Just as a bridge will fall down if the laws governing the
structural soundness of bridge construction are not obeyed, so a
human society will fall down if the rights contained in the liberal
conception of justice are ignored (p. 4-7).
This account certainly sounds sensible, but it is also ambiguous.
Initially, we might ask about the goals of happiness, peace, and
prosperity. What is the content of these ends and why are they
choice-worthy? Moreover, the relation between happiness, peace,
and prosperity and individual persons is not formulated precisely.
Is the goal for each and every person to be happy? To maximize
the total amount of happiness summed across all persons? To pro
vide each and every person the opportunity to be happy? Or is it
something else? These questions are not clearly answered in
Structure, and one might .even suspect that they are studiously
avoided.
More generally, Structure is ambiguous with respect to one of
the central questions of contemporary political philosophy: should
justification proceed on the basis of deep foundations in moral phi
losophy or theology, or should political justification limit itself to
the shallow resources of public reason? As we shall see, this ques
tion is crucial to the argument of Structure. I will proceed by exam
ining the implications of each interpretation in tum.
Before I begin the task of clarifying the foundations of
I should note that Barnett himself believes such founda
tional work is not essential to his enterprise. After discussing
whether his approach is consequentialist or deontological, Barnett
concludes: "Perhaps all this suggests that how we describe or cate
gorize the analysis I will present here is less important than the
merits of the analysis itself" (p. 24). But this assumes that the work
of clarification is merely a matter of applying labels. If that were
the case, then Barnett would surely be correct to set the problem
aside as a merely academic exercise. If, on the other hand, ques
tions about foundations must be answered in order to determine
what Barnetfs analysis is and therefore what its merits are, then the
proper answer to foundational inquiries is not a plea of confession
and avoidance.

Structure,

B.

Does

Structure

Rest on Deep Moral Foundations?

One possible interpretation of Structure is that its arguments
rest on deep moral foundations. On this interpretation, Structure
posits a particular set of human interests (in happiness, peace, and
prosperity) and claims that these interests really are the true and
universal interests of all persons. These interests are general and
abstract in nature. Given Barnett's account of the problems of
knowledge, the claim that these interests are universal need not en-
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tail the further conclusion that there is any .single plan of life that
leads to happiness for all humans. There might be many plans of
life that can lead to happiness, and the selection from among these
might vary from individual to individual. Nonetheless, on the deep
moral-foundations interpretation of Structure, it would be the case
that happiness, peace, and prosperity are true and universal human
interests that would serve as the ultimate moral foundation upon
which The Structure of Liberty rests.

1. Happiness, Peace, and Prosperity
Investigation of the deep-moral-round,ations ,interpretation can
begin with an examination of "happiness, peace, and prosperity."
Barnett has very little to say about these foundational ends.
Indeed, his discussion of them suggests that he does not find ques
tions about these ends to be fruitful ones:
This natural law account of moral "principles of society" assumes, of
course, that "happiness . . . peace and prosperity" are appropriate
ends. While the essence or nature of happiness, peace and prosperity
may properly be controversial, should anyone question the assump
tion that these are desirable ends to be pursued, additional arguments
will need to be presented. [p. 7]

To some extent, Barnett is on safe ground when he assumes that
happiness, peace, and prosperity are desirable ends. If not these
ends, then which ends? Questions arise immediately, however. Ini
tially, the three ends do not seem to be of equal moral status. Hap
piness is a good candidate for a noninstrumental or final end: we
desire happiness for its own sake and not for the sake of anything
else. Peace and prosperity, on the other hand, might plausibly be
viewed as instrumental to happiness. We want peace and prosper
ity so that we can pursue happiness, not the other way around. If
these three ends are foundational, it is clear that happiness provides
the cornerstone of Structure's foundation.
As Barnett acknowledges, the essence or nature of happiness is
controversial (p. 7). And the nature of happiness might affect the
argument of Structure. For example, the classical Aristotelian view
of happiness is that happiness requires a life of reason involving
activities done well, that is, in accord with the human excellences or
virtues.21 One implication of this view might be that an essential
role of the state is the inculcation of virtue.22 Barnett addresses this
argument with his now familiar strategy. He argues that the burden
is on the advocates of state-enforced virtue to show that they can
21. See ARISTOTLE, N1coMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, ch. 10 in 2 THE COMPLETE WoRKS OF
at l100al0-1101a21 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
22. See id. bk. I, ch. 13, at 1102a5-15; FRED D. Mn.I.ER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE, AND
RIGHTS IN ARISToTLE's Politics 13 (1995).
ARISTOTLE
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overcome the problems of .knowledge, interest, and power (p. 306).
account of virtue, however, might address these issues. For
example, Barnett's discussion of the problem of knowledge assumes
that individuals possess the knowledge necessary to make choices
affecting their own happiness. A virtue-centered theory of the state
might counter that such knowledge can only be possessed and effec
tively used by persons who already possess the virtues to a suffi
cient degree. Perhaps it is the case that only persons with the
intellectual virtues of theoretical and practical wisdom can make
use of their individual and local knowledge in a way that leads to
happiness. This is not the occasion to take up Barnett's challenge
- to offer a virtue-centered account of the role of the state in the
promotion of virtue that takes the problems of knowledge, interest,
and power into full account. Rather, the point is that an investiga
tion of foundational questions, such as connections between virtue,
knowledge, and happiness, might undermine fundamental presup
positions of Barnett's argument. H Barnett contends otherwise for example, if he claims that the argument of Structure extends to
any plausible notion of happiness, irrespective of the conceptual
framework in which the notion is embedded - then a heavy argu
mentative burden goes with that contention. After preliminary
skirmishing about the burden of proof, Barnett will need to get
down to the difficult task of engaging particular theories of happi
ness on their merits.
A full

2. A Utilitarian Interpretation
Laying aside questions about the nature of happiness, there
remain questions with respect to the role that happiness plays in
Barnett's foundational argument. One plausible interpretation of
Structure is that its foundations are consequentialist or utilitarian.
The first piece of evidence for this interpretation is negative. On
the surface, at least, it appears that Barnett does not rely on any
deontological premises for ultimate foundations. In this regard
Barnett differs from Robert Nozick, who made self-ownership a
fundamental premise in the justificatory strategy of Anarchy, State,
and Utopia.23 Rather, his strategy is similar to that employed by
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty.24 Like Mill, Barnett seems to forgo
23. Nozick begins ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA as follows: "Individuals have rights,
and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So
strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the
state and its officials may do." ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974) .
24. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY AND
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 74 (H.B. Acton ed., 1972) ("It is
proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the
idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal
on all ethical questions . . . .").
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any advantage that could be derived by. assuming self-ownership,
autonomy, or rights of personhood.
Tue second piece of evidence for the consequentialist interpre
tation of Structure is the reliance on happiness, peace, and prosper
ity as the normative predicates in Barnett's hypothetical imperative.
Barnett introduces these ends by quoting a sermon delivered by
Elizur Goodrich to the Governor and General Assembly of
Connecticut on the eve of the Constitutional Convention: "No
more can mankind be conducted to happiness; or civil societies
united, and enjoy peace and prosperity, without observing the
moral principles and connections, which the same Almighty Crea
tor has established for the government of the moral world."25 More
particularly, Structure takes as a given "the goal of enabling persons
to survive and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living
in society with others" (p. 23). Because B arnett has so little to say
about this goal, it is not clear whether the goal is to maximize hap
piness, peace, and prosperity, to provide each person with a suffi
cient amount of these goods, or something else. A maximizing
interpretation is not wholly implausible, however, and the notion
that happiness should be maximized is a straightforward version of
eudaimonistic utilitarianism.26
A third piece of evidence is Barnett's use of consequentialist
reasoning in his explication of the first problem of interest, in other
words, the problem of partiality. Recall that Barnett argued that
the problem of partiality justified the rights of several property and
freedom from contract. Why was this so? Tue example of Ann and
Ben, quoted above, provided the reason: "When pursuing his per
sonal projects, Ann's rights of several property and freedom from
contract require Ben to act 'impartially' with respect to Ann's inter
est whether he wants to or not" (p. 140). But why is "impartiality"
required? Tue consequentialist interpretation of Barnett provides a
natural explanation: utilitarians sum interests (utility) across per
sons. Ben should be impartial with respect to Ann's interests
because the right outcome is the outcome that maximizes the sum
of Ann and Ben's utility. Impartiality across the interests of per
sons is a quintessentially utilitarian idea.27
25. Elizur Goodrich, The Principles of Civil Union and Happiness Considered and
Recommended, in PoLmcAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA: 1730-1805, at
915 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) (quoted at p. 1).
26. Eudaimonistic utilitarianism takes as its maximand happiness, as opposed to
preference-satisfaction utilitarianism (maximizing preference-satisfaction), hedonistic utilita
rianism (maximizing the balance of pleasures over pains), or welfare utilitarianism (maximiz
ing interests). See generally Eudaimonism, Tue Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 251
(Robert Audi ed. 1995); ROBERT E. GoooIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PuBLIC PHILOSOPHY 13
(1995).
27. See Robert E. Goodin, Utility and the Good in A CoMPANION To ETHICS 20 (Peter
Singer ed. 1993).
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The fourth and most salient piece of evidence is Barnett's
explicit discussion of the question as to whether his theory is utilita
rian. It is interesting that Barnett does not take an unequivocal
stand, even though he recognizes the question. The crucial passage
is worth quoting at length:
Is a natural rights analysis utilitarian? Though this type of philo
sophical question is really beyond the scope of this book, for what it is
worth, my answer depends on how the term "utilitarian" is used. If
utilitarian is viewed as a consequentialist approach that evaluates
practices by their consequences, then the conception of natural rights
sketched here appears to be consequentialist, though only indirectly.
If utilitarianism is viewed as a general theory of ethics or morality,
however, then the natural rights approach presented here, though
consequentialist, is not utilitarian. The approach presented here does
not provide a theory of how persons ought to pursue the good life, the
traditional province of ethics. [p. 23]

Barnett is simply declaring himself in these passages; he is not pro
viding an argument for (or even an explanation of) his position.
What are we to make of these remarks? One clue to Barnett's
position is that his position "evaluates practices by their conse
quences" and that it is "consequentialist, though only indirectly" (p.
23). Here we need to be cautious. When Barnett refers to the eval
uation of practices as opposed to acts by their consequences, he is
likely referring to a distinction akin to that between act and rule
utilitarianism. When he refers to indirect as opposed to direct con
sequentialism, he might be referring to the act/rule distinction or he
might be referring to the difference between direct consequential
ism as a practical standard for decisionmaking and indirect conse
quentialism as a theory for the evaluation of practical standards for
decisionmaking. If Barnett intends the latter meaning by his refer
ence to indirect utilitarianism, then his discussion may conflate two
different distinctions that are made in utilitarian theory. All of this
requires further explication to make Barnett's position clear.
Begin with the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism.
Act utilitarianism takes the individual action as the morally rele
vant unit. Thus, "act so that your action produces the best conse
quences of all the available actions" is an act utilitarian principle.
For example, if in a particular case, breaking your promise produces
greater utility than keeping it, then act utilitarianism requires you
to break your promise. Rule utilitarianism takes general rules as
the morally relevant unit. Thus, "act so that your action is in con
formity with the set of moral rules that maximizes utility as com
pared to other possible rule sets" is a rule utilitarian principle.
Even if promise breaking would maximize utility on this particular
occasion, rule utilitarianism might require you to keep your prom-
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ise if the utility-maximizing set of moral rules required that
promises be kept. Barnett states that his approach evaluates the
utility of "practices" (p. 23), suggesting that he is not an act utilita
rian but a "practice" utilitarian.
What does Barnett mean by "practice"? Initially, he does not
mean moral rules, such as "keep your promises" or "do not lie."
This is clear from his statement that he does not have a comprehen
sive moral theory, "a theory of how persons ought to pursue the
good life" (p. 23). By "practice," he evidently means to refer only
to practices that lie within the sphere of social ordering or law.
Moreover, Barnett's approach does not seem to allow for the evalu
ation of individual legal rules (such as particular statutes) by assess
ing their utility. Barnett makes this clear when he says that if
utilitarianism is "a method of decision making in which the effects
of various policies are assessed by determining their effects" (p. 24)
then his view is not utilitarian. Rather, it appears that the relevant
unit is the conception of justice.28 We assess conceptions of justice
by considering their impact on happiness, peace, and prosperity,
and then we assess individual legal rules (statutes, common law
rules, etc.) by their conformity to the conception of justice.
Why should we limit our utility assessment to conceptions of
justice and avoid the assessment of individual legal rules or even
individual actions? Several explanations might be available to
Barnett. One possibility is that Barnett believes conception-of-jus
tice utilitarianism to be extensionally equivalent29 to legal-rule utili
tarianism and/or act utilitarianism; in other words, the choice of
unit for utility assessment makes no difference in practice. This
explanation, however, seems inconsistent with Barnett's insistence
that his theory does not assess the utilities of individual legal rules
or policies (p. 24).
Another possibility is that Barnett believes that conception-of
justice utilitarianism is preferable to legal-rule utilitarianism or act
utilitarianism because of problems of knowledge, interest, or
power. For example, Barnett may believe that if individuals
attempt to act in conformity with act utilitarianism, they will fail
because they lack sufficient knowledge to assess the utility of their
actions. It is not clear, however, that a similar argument can be
28. The text should be qualified in the following respect. The utility of individual legal
rules could be a proper step in the assessment of conceptions of justice. Thus, one might
proceed as follows. One takes a conception of justice. One then evaluates the various legal
rules that would follow from the conception of justice for utility. This procedure is iterated
until the various conceptions of justice have been evaluated. The conception with the highest
utility score is then selected. That conception is then used to evaluate individual legal rules.
Individual legal rule utility would play its role only at the state of selecting the best concep
tion of justice.
29. See DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM x (1965).
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made to justify the selection of conception-of-justice utilitarianism
over legal-rule utilitarianism. This is because the problem of
knowledge is likely to be more acute for conceptions of justice than
it is for individual legal rules. Utility assessments require knowl
edge of consequences, and consequences are relatively easier to
predict for individual legal rules than they are to predict for entire
conceptions of justice. Conceptions of justice impact many legal
rules and may be consistent with several different alternative sets of
legal rules. For this reason, scoring the utility of entire conceptions
of justice is likely to pose greater problems of knowledge than scor
ing the utility of individual legal rules.
Another possibility is that Barnett would appeal here to
problems of interest to justify conception-of-justice utilitarianism.
Perhaps legal rulemakers are likely to be partial in their selection of
legal rules if they use utility as a standard because the utility of
individual legal rules may appear ambiguous or uncertain and
hence provide insufficient guidance. If, on the other hand, legal
rule makers act in accord with the liberal conception of justice, they
may be able to avoid the problem of partiality, precisely because
the liberal conception forbids the selection of partial rules by guar
anteeing rights of several property, freedom of contract, and so
forth. These possibilities are not discussed in Structure. What is
clear is that Barnett himself provides no justification for
conception-of-justice utilitarianism, and that such a justification is
required if such a utilitarian theory is to provide deep foundations
for The Structure of Liberty.
These matters are further complicated by the distinction
between direct and indirect consequentialism. The direct/indirect
distinction could be used synonymously with the distinction
between act and rule utilitarianism.30 But this distinction is also
used to reflect a related but different distinction, that between prin
ciples "for use in practical moral thinking"31 and decisions that
"would be arrived at by leisured moral thought in completely ade
quate knowledge of the facts, as the right answer in a specific
case."32 If Barnett's approach were indirect in this sense, this
would mean that the foundational moral theory is act utilitarianism.
Act utilitarianism would be the theory that would be used to evalu
ate the individual actions made as a result of legal rules from the
point of view of leisured moral thought unconstrained by problems
30. Act utilitarianism would be said to be direct, because individual actions are evaluated
directly for their utility. Rule utilitarianism would be said to be indirect, because acts are
evaluated for utility indirectly via the system of rules.
31. R.M. Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 31
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
32. Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction to UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, 1,
15 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
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of knowledge and interest. The liberal conception of justice would
provide principles for use in practical moral thinking at the level of
legal rule formulation, and the legal rules would provide practical
principles for use by individual agents when making decisions con
cerning the use of resources in social interactions.33 If this interpre
tation is correct, then Barnett was in error when he stated that his
approach is utilitarian in the sense that it "evaluates practices by
their consequences" (p. 23).
The text of Structure is not sufficiently explicit on this issue to
permit a confident judgment as to, whether Barnett intends his the
ory to be indirect in this sense. One consideration favoring this in
terpretation of Structure is that indirect utilitarianism has been
justified on grounds that are very similar to what Barnett calls the
problems of knowledge and interest. Thus, R.M. Hare, the philoso
pher most strongly associated with indirect utilitarianism, explained
that the direct application of act utilitarian principles is "appropri
ate only to 'a cool hour', in which there is time for unlimited investi
gation of the facts, and there is no temptation to special
pleading."34 Given the central role that the problems of knowledge
and interest play in Structure, it would seem that Hare's indirect
utilitarianism is at least consistent with many of Barnett's central
ideas.
The choice between the two interpretations of Barnett's
remarks on utilitarianism is not merely an academic exercise. It has
profound implications for the status of the liberal conception of jus
tice. Conception-of-justice utilitarianism holds that actions or legal
rules violating the liberal conception of justice violate a moral duty
if they violate the conception that maximizes utility. If this is
Barnett's position, then the constraints of the liberal conception are
strong constraints. They cannot be overridden by showing that a
particular action or legal rule would maximize utility even though it
violates the conception.
Indirect utilitarianism does not entail that the liberal conception
of justice creates strong constraints. If the liberal conception is sup
ported by indirect utilitarianism, then it provides the standard for
ordinary, practical moral deliberation. · But its conclusions could be
overridden if cool reflection with adequate knowledge and assess
ment of possible problems of partiality reveals that a particular
legal rule would maximize utility, even if that rule violates the lib
eral conception. Since legal rule formulation frequently does take
place under conditions of cool reflection, it would seem plausible
33. But there might be other moral principles that would address other questions, such as
whether one should keep one's noncontractual promises, whether to give to charity, and so
forth.
34. Hare, supra note 30, at 31.
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that this possibility would be more than merely theoretical. The
distinction between conception-of-justice utilitarianism and indirect
act utilitarianism correlates with the difference between a liberal
conception of justice as the ultimate standard of political morality
and the liberal conception of justice as a practical guideline for
political and legal choice.

3. A Deontological Interpretation
have considered the possibility that Structure

So far, I
rests on
deep foundations in utilitarian moral theory, but there are passages
that suggest something quite different. Despite the emphasis in
Structure on happiness, peace, and prosperity as goals, there are
other passages that suggest a deontological moral theory as the
deep foundation for the liberal conception of justice. The most
striking passage occurs near the close of Barnett's discussion of the
question of whether his views are utilitarian: "[R]especting natural
rights, not the calculation and aggregation of subjective prefer
ences, promotes the common good. And the common good is
viewed, not as a sum of preference satisfaction, but as the ability of
each person to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while acting
in close proximity to others" (p. 24; emphasis added).
This passage is problematic for a number of reasons. Initially,
there is the use of the phrase "common good,"35 which suggests that
a consequentialist or teleological reason is being offered. Common
good, however, is defined in a way that might belie this suggestion.
The definition of common good is "the ability of each person to
pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while acting in close prox
imity to others" (p. 24). One interpretation of this phrase is that
the justification for the liberal conception of justice rests on a moral
right of each person to a set of legal rights governing social interac
tions that create an equal opportunity for the pursuit of happiness.
It is apparent that the interpretation I have just offered differs in
several respects from Barnett's own formulation. In order to make
this transformation plausible, a number of issues should be
considered.
Initially, there is a minor difficulty with the qualifying phrase "in
close proximity to others" that concludes the definition of the com
mon good (p. 24). It seems unlikely that Barnett intends this phrase
to be taken in its literal sense. Surely physical proximity is not rele
vant here. There is no good reason to believe that the liberal con
ception of justice would apply to humans who live in dense urban
environments like New York City but would not apply to Navaho
people who choose to live in geographically dispersed locales.
35. So far as I can tell, the phrase "common good" occurs only in this passage. This is the
only entry for "common good" that appears in the index of Structure. P. 339.
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More likely, proximity is used here to signify conditions under
which humans engage in significant social interaction with respect
to the use of resources and the exchange of services. Another
minor point concerns the inclusion of peace in the list of things that
each individual should have an ability to pursue (p. 24). It seems
likely that peace is one of the conditions that make the pursuit of
happiness and prosperity possible. There is no good reason to be
lieve that each individual should have the ability to pursue peace.36
The next question concerns the meaning of "the ability of each
person to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity" (p. 24; emphasis
added). What is meant by ability here? Without reference to con
text, one might interpret ability to mean individual capacity, but
this seems implausible. Nothing in Structure suggests that Barnett
is concerned with providing either the character traits or intellec
tual development that would facilitate the pursuit of happiness and
prosperity. A more plausible interpretation is that ability here is
being used to refer to opportunity. Thus, the notion is that each
individual should have an opportunity to pursue happiness and
prosperity.
Two more questions remain concerning this formulation: What
quantum of opportunity should be provided and how should it be
distributed across persons? Should we maximize the opportunity
·set without regard to the distribution of opportunities among per
sons? This interpretation seems implausible, both because this fails
to give meaning to the qualifier "each" in "each person" and be
cause Barnett's move to the common good is explicitly aimed
against a maximizing approach. A plausible interpretation is that
each person should have an adequate opportunity to pursue happi
ness and prosperity, equal to the opportunity provided to every
other person. A variation of this would require that each person
have the maximum opportunity to pursue happiness and prosperity,
consistent with an equal opportunity for every other person.
Structure has little to say that would permit us to choose between
these two formulations.
Suppose then that the foundational principle of Structure is that
each and every person should be given the maximum opportunity
to pursue happiness and prosperity that is consistent with an equal
opportunity for every other person .- call this the "opportunity
for-happiness principle" for short. The liberal conception of justice
would then be the set of background rights that satisfies this princi
ple, given the problems of knowledge, interest, and power. This
36. Peace is most plausibly seen as a condition for the individual pursuit of happiness and
prosperity. It does not seem plausible to posit the opportunities of individuals to pursue
peace as a foundational goal. Although some individuals may have life plans that include
working for peace, there is no reason that each and every individual should be provided the
opportunity to pursue this particular calling as opposed to any other.
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principle is most naturally viewed as rooted in a deontological ap
proach to ethics. One example of deontological ethics is Thomas
Scanlon's contractualism, which holds that an action is wrong if it
would be disallowed by any principle that no one could reasonably
reject.37 The opportunity-for-happiness principle might plausibly
be seen as one that no one could reasonably reject, although I can
not sketch the argument for that conclusion on this occasion. The
deontological interpretation also finds some support in the text of
Structure. Barnett suggests that his approach is difficult to distin
guish from one in which "[r]ights are used to create a legal system
which defines a set of compossible territories that provides the nec
essary political condition for the possibility that individuals might"
pursue happiness and prosperity.38 Barnett acknowledges that such
an approach might be deontological (p. 24).
If Structure has deontological foundations, once again there are
important implications for the content and status of the liberal con
ception of justice. Deontological foundations are likely to lead to
the view that the liberal conception imposes strong constraints on
the content of legal rules. One of the important differences
between consequentialist and deontological morality concerns the
question of whether good consequences can override moral rules,
such as the rule of political morality provided by the liberal concep
tion of justice. Deontological theories severely constrain or even
forbid the overriding of such moral rules on the grounds that good
consequences would accrue. Moreover, the content of the liberal
conception of justice might change once the requirements of the
underlying deontological moral foundations were laid bare.
Because Barnett does not take a stand on these fundamental issues,
they cannot be resolved without doing extensive reconstruction of
Structure's foundations.
C. Public Reasons
So far, my discussion of Structure's fundamental premises has
focused on the possibility that the liberal conception of justice has
deep foundations in a comprehensive moral theory of the good.
There are, however, cogent reasons to believe that Barnett wishes
to avoid commitment to any particular comprehensive doctrine.
The way that Barnett phrases his reluctance is quite odd. He sug
gests that he is simply not interested in the way his views would be
categorized by contemporary academic moral and political philoso
phy. He writes, "I care less about a topology of the reasons I ad37. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OnrnR 197 (1998); T.M. Scanlon, Con·
tractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 30, at 103.
38. P. 24 (quoting DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN & DOUGLAS J. DEN UYL, LIBERTY AND
NATURE 115 (1991)).
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vance for a particular conception of justice and the rule of law than
I do the reasons themselves" (p. 24). Surely, Barnett is right to re
ject classification as an end in itself, but neatness in academic label
ing is not the reason one might wish to know about the
foundational status of Structure. There are profound differences
between the various moral theories that might serve a foundational
role for Structure. I have already explored some of the ways that
such differences might affect the force and content of the liberal
conception of justice. In addition, there is another difference of
substantial importance. Foundational theories are controversial.
To the extent that the argument of Structure rests on normative
premises derived from a comprehensive moral doctrine, that argu
ment will be unconvincing to those who reject the premises. We
therefore should consider the question of whether Structure needs
deep moral foundations at all.

Could The Structure of Liberty stand instead on the shallow
foundations provided by the resources of public reason? We can
investigate this question by examining the account of political justi
fication offered by Rawls in his book Political Liberalism. 39 Rawls
believes that it is unrealistic to expect agreement on the deep foun
dations for our political convictions. Why not? Rawls's answer de
pends on two further ideas: the fact ofpluralism and the burdens of
judgment. Modem democratic societies are characterized by what
Rawls calls "the fact of pluralism" - the fact that there is a "plural
ity of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the
meaning, value and purpose of human life. "40 In societies like ours,
there are many different religious and moral views about what sort
of life is best and what is the nature of the good. Moreover, the
plurality of comprehensive religious and moral views is a durable
feature of modem political life because of what Rawls calls "bur
dens of judgment. "41 Disagreement (about matters such as the ulti
mate moral foundations of a conception of justice) is expected and
reasonable given the difficulties of coming to consensus about these
topics. These difficulties include: complex and conflicting evi
dence, disagreement about what is relevant and how to weigh the
considerations that are relevant, the underdeterminacy introduced
by hard cases, the fact that there may be different kinds of Jlorma
tive arguments on both sides of a moral question, and differences in
forms of life that lead to different standards for the evaluation of
evidence and argument.42
39. RAwr.s, supra note 20.
40. John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4
(1987); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1083, 1087-89
(1990).
41. RAwr.s, supra note 20, at 54-58.
42. See id. at 56-57.
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These considerations suggest an alternative explanation for
Barnett's reluctance to commit to deep moral foundations. His re
luctance might reflect the notion that such foundations are inappro
priate for a theory of justice that is to regulate the basic structure of
a pluralist society. We have already seen that Barnett does not take
a clear stand about the sort of political justification that is appropri
ate for his theory. There are, however, elements of Barnett's ap
proach that strongly suggest that a society ordered by the liberal
conception of justice would be a pluralist society. First, the liberal
conception would create the conditions for pluralism. Although
Barnett's theory does not directly address freedom of thought and
expression, the constraints of the liberal conception of justice would
seem to require that human communication be ordered by a regime
of private property and contract and not be regulated by the state.
Under these conditions, we would expect there to be a variety of
comprehensive moral and religious doctrines of the good. Second,
Barnett's discussion of the first order problem of knowledge sug
gests that he believes that humans do not all share the same set of
interests and values. One aspect of the first order problem of
knowledge is that persons have individual knowledge of their own
interests and values; such individual knowledge presumes that such
interests are different for different persons. Third, Barnett is ex
plicit that his theory is not committed to any particular conception
of the good: "The approach presented here does not provide a the
ory of how persons ought to pursue the good life" (p. 23). For these
three reasons, Barnett's views are at least compatible with the
premise that a society ordered by the liberal conception of justice
would be a pluralist society.
What sort of justification is appropriate for the conception of
justice that is to order the basic structure of a pluralist society? 1\vo
considerations suggest that the appropriate justification should not
rest on particular moral or philosophical views about the good.
First, as a practical matter, justifications rooted in comprehensive
doctrines are not likely to work beyond the group of existing adher
ents to the doctrine. Thus, if Structure had been rooted in a particu
lar r�ligious view, such as Catholicism or Islam, or if it had been
grountled on a particular moral theory, such as Kant's theory or
comprehensive act-utilitarianism, the argument of Structure would
have had limited appeal. Second, as a matter of political morality,
it can be argued that the legitimacy of a society regulated by a con
ception of justice depends in part on that conception having a justi
fication that can be accepted as reasonable by those who will live in
the society. Rawls calls this idea "the liberal principle of legiti
macy." This principle holds that "our exercise of political power is
proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance
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with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reason
ably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational."43 It is not reason
able to expect citizens who hold their own comprehensive views
about religion and morality to endorse the conception of justice
that regulates their society on the basis of a different comprehen
sive doctrine. For example, Baptists could not reasonably be ex
pected to endorse utilitarianism, Buddhism, or secular humanism as
the fundamental foundation for the principles that regulate the ba
sic structure of society.
Given that it is neither practical nor fair to rest the justification
for a conception of justice on controversial moral and religious
views about the good life, what is the alternative? Tue justification
for a conception of justice can be limited to the resources of public
reason, the common reason of all the rational and reasonable mem
bers of a community.44 These resources include common sense, the
uncontroversial conclusions of science, and values that can be
derived from the public political culture. By limiting the justifica
tion of the liberal conception of justice to public reason, Barnett
would make his theory accessible to those who adhere to a wide
variety of religious and moral doctrines. Rawls postulates that in
these circumstances a conception of justice could become the focus
of an overlapping consensus.45 Tue adherents of various compre
hensive doctrines would find their own deep foundations for the
public values on which the conception rests.
Can Structure rest on foundations limited to public reason? Tue
answer to this question is surely yes, because for the most part, it
already does. Tue development of the problems of knowledge,
interest, and power is accomplished through the use of common
sense and uncontroversial premises. It is true that the factual con
clusions that Barnett draws from these premises are controversial;
Barnett argues that the problems of knowledge, interest, and power
create strong constraints on the role of the state. This feature of
Structure is not problematic, however, so far as the requirements of
public reason are concerned. So long as novel and controversial
factual conclusions are supported with the resources of public rea
son, these conclusions are accessible to reasonable persons who ad
here to a wide variety of comprehensive doctrines.46
Do the normative premises of Structure comport with the re
quirements of public reason? More particularly, is the "common

43. Id. at 217.
44. See id. at 212-54.
45. See id. at 133-72.
46. See Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1459, 1476-77
(1996).
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good . . . viewed, not as a sum of preference satisfaction, but as the
ability of each person to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity"
(p. 24) a value that can be derived from the public political culture?
A full answer to this question is outside the scope of this review, but
a tentative inquiry suggests that there are good reasons to believe
that Structure's definition of the common good satisfies the stric
tures of public reason. The goal, providing each person the oppor
tunity to pursue happiness and prosperity, is formulated with
sufficient generality and abstraction to avoid commitment to any
particular moral or religious conception of the good. If we focus on
the United States as a case study, similar goals are deeply rooted in
our public political culture. For example, the Preamble of the
United States Constitution includes "domestic Tranquility" and
"the general Welfare" as aims. Moreover, it seems likely that
opportunities for happiness, peace, and prosperity are values that
could be affirmed by individuals who adhere to a wide variety of
religious and moral views about ultimate questions of good. Even if
Barnett's precise formulation of these goals might be objectionable,
it seems likely that an alternative formulation could fill the needed
role in the argument. Because the problems of knowledge, interest,
and power are so pervasive, the core argument of Structure would
survive if "the general welfare" or "opportunity of individuals to
pursue chosen plans of life" were substituted for happiness and
prosperity.
Thus, a persuasive case can be made that the best interpretation
(or reformulation) of the argument of Structure would eschew the
need for deep foundations and rely instead on a shallow foundation
constructed only from the materials of public reason. This move,
however, cannot be made without paying a price. For example, to
the extent that the argument of Structure relies at any point on max
imization of happiness and prosperity as the justification for not
limiting or qualifying the rights contained in the liberal conception
of justice, that feature of the argument would no longer be valid.
The values that can be affirmed by the public reason of a pluralist
society are necessarily less robust than those which are located
within particular comprehensive doctrines. Whereas utilitarianism
or Kantianism may have determinate implications for particular
questions about the form or content of legal rights, public political
values are likely to become relatively more underdeterminate as
the question at issue becomes more concrete. The implication for
Structure is that any robust conclusions will need to be supported by
arguments that rely on the problems of knowledge, interest, and
power for their cutting force.
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THE FOURTH ORDER PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

Finally, I would like to take up an issue that arose in connection
with the question of whether Structure should be interpreted as
resting on a form of rule utilitarianism.47 The argument of Structure
depends on knowledge of consequences. The liberal conception of
justice is preferred over the alternatives, because the liberal concep
tion fares better with respect to the problems of knowledge, inter
est, and power. Moreover, Structure claims that the role of such
consequentialist arguments should be indirect rather than direct.48
We should evaluate individual legal rules by the liberal conception
of justice; consequences should be brought to bear only at the level
of selecting the conception.
There is, however, a problem of knowledge associated with this
method of analysis. Let us call this problem "the fourth order prob
lem of knowledge." This problem of knowledge stems from the fact
that it is relatively more difficult to assess the consequences of
whole conceptions of justice than it is to assess individual legal
rules. There are several reasons why this is so. Initially, the conse
quences of adopting whole conceptions of justice cannot be as
sessed directly. Problems of knowledge, interest, and power arise
in concrete choice situations, and attend to individual legal rules
that govern those situations. In addition, the consequences of
whole conceptions of justice are global in nature. When we com
pare two conceptions of justice on the basis of their consequences,
the task is an enormous one. Because so many individual legal
rules will change, it is a daunting task to simply trace out the causal
connections one by one. This problem is compounded by the diffi
culty of assessing the interactions between simultaneous changes in
many different legal rriles. Finally, the problem of assessing conse
quences is complicated by the fact that abstract conceptions of jus
tice may be satisfied by several different sets of particular legal
rules. Selecting the optimum set for each conception of justice is
itself a difficult task.

If we accept that the fourth-order problem of knowledge is real
and substantial, what are the implications for Structure? The most
important implication concerns the status of the liberal conception
of justice. Given the fourth order problem of knowledge, it seems
difficult to sustain Barnett's claim that consequences should not
play a role in the design of particular legal rules. Of course, there
may be countervailing considerations that would caution against
departure from the requirements of the liberal conception of justice
on the basis of a rule-by-rule assessment of the consequences. For
47. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
48. See discussion supra section II.B.2.

1812

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 97:1780

example, problems of partiality may counsel against individualized
assessment of consequences. Based on this preliminary assessment,
however, the fourth order problem of knowledge would appear to
be a substantial one. There does not seem to be any a priori reason
to believe that problems of partiality would always trump the fourth
order problem of knowledge.
If the fourth order problem of knowledge justifies departures
from the liberal conception of justice, does this strengthen or
weaken Structure? On the one hand, it might be argued that the
power of the theory is weakened, because it would no longer pro
vide trumping a priori arguments against departures from the
liberal conception based on particularized assessment of conse
quences. On the other hand, this very weakness might actually en
hance the persuasiveness of the argument as a whole, particularly to
readers who are intuitively uncomfortable with the radical conclu
sions reached in Structure. Once the fourth order problem of
knowledge is taken into account, those readers are free to get off
the boat when they believe that a departure from the liberal con
ception is justified. The price of justifiable exit, however, is a per
suasive argument that the problems of knowledge, interest, and
power have really been taken into account. This approach leaves
intact the central argument of Structure and creates the maximum
room for both liberal and conservative foes to constructively en
gage its arguments. In the end, a frank acknowledgement of the
fourth order problem of knowledge can strengthen the force and
persuasiveness of Structure's core.
CONCLUSION

The Structure of Liberty makes substantial contributions to fun
damental debates over the proper function of law. Perhaps the
most important contribution of Structure is its detailed development
of the problems of knowledge, interest, and power. The accessibil
ity of the arguments for the importance of these problems opens up
an opportunity for readers unfamiliar with the libertarian tradition
of social thought to engage with ideas that have a power to provoke
rethinking of fundamental assumptions about the proper function
of law. Hardly less significant is Structure's wealth of creative ideas
about concrete problems of social policy, especially with respect to
the alternatives to our dismal practices of punishment. The
Structure of Liberty puts a provocative set of ideas on the table for
discussion. That these ideas will be taken up seems assured by the
power and clarity of Professor Barnett's important book.

